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Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely on enterprise
to plant floor connectivity. Where the size, diversity, and
therefore complexity of ICS increase, operational require-
ments, goals, and challenges defined by users across vari-
ous sub-systems follow. Recent trends in Information Tech-
nology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) convergence
may cause operators to lose a comprehensive understanding
of end-to-end data flow requirements. This presents a risk
to system security and resilience. Sensors were once solely
applied for operational process use, but now act as inputs
supporting a diverse set of organisational requirements. If
these are not fully understood, incomplete risk assessment,
and inappropriate implementation of security controls could
occur. In search of a solution, operators may turn to stan-
dards and guidelines. This paper reviews popular standards
and guidelines, prior to the presentation of a case study
and conceptual tool, highlighting the importance of data
flows, critical data processing points, and system-to-user re-
lationships. The proposed approach forms a basis for risk
assessment and security control implementation, aiding the
evolution of ICS security and resilience.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used across a variety
of sectors, for the operation of industrial processes. These
include electricity generation and distribution, water treat-
ment and distribution, manufacturing, etc. – some of which
are considered to be critical national infrastructures [10] due
to the impact of their operations on societies’ well-being.
Over recent years the industrial sector has seen a signifi-
cant rise in the number of disclosed ICS vulnerabilities [23].
While this increase in technically focused research has its
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benefits, challenges still remain not only in how best to con-
vey the importance of security to those in industry, but how
best to understand operational objectives across multiple
system levels/business areas, and ensuring any form of se-
curity implementation does not degrade usability or create
a cascading effect, that adversely impacts local or business
wide operational objectives.
In process industries such as oil, gas, and chemicals, the
ability to identify shifts in patterns that could eventually
cause undesirable output is vital. Of particular concern are
critical data processing points, which if changed have the po-
tential to impact processes operations, remaining undetected
beyond the point of safe recovery. In [36], Weiss provides an
example of how a seemingly insignificant change of sensor
signal filtering parameters resulted in significant damage of
equipment at a nuclear power plant.
Control systems used to be pneumatic in nature, prior
to the transition towards electronic alternatives, and ulti-
mately computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) concepts
of the 1970s, where data and information became the most
essential ingredients in automation, with the key to han-
dling data and information established as a transparent in-
formation flow inside an automation system. A challenge
then arose in finding an automation architecture capable of
integrating all levels and functional units of an enterprise,
starting from strategic planning down to the process floor.
To cope with the anticipated complexity, a strict subdivision
of the data processing into a hierarchical model was devised
that became known as the automation pyramid [30].
Figure 1: The Purdue Model [16]
Fig. 1 depicts the automation pyramid, also referred to as
the Purdue model. Discussed in [16], the Purdue model is
seen as a simple way of compartmentalising ICS functional-
ity into hierarchical layers. In accompaniment to Fig. 1, [16]
provides additional summarisation of each system level, in-
cluding example devices and their function. Allocation of de-
vices to automation levels also highlights varying time con-
straints associated with data collection and response, con-
textualising the importance of device functions. Simply put,
when discussing devices residing in the lower levels of an ICS,
such as sensors, actuators, Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLC), Remote Terminal Units (RTU), etc. communica-
tions must take place on a scale of seconds, in some cases
milliseconds. However, devices residing in mid to higher
levels, such as data historians, human machine interfaces,
Information Technology (IT) workstations, etc. may only
be required to communicate on a scale of minutes to hours,
in some cases days and weeks.
Whereas Operation Technology (OT) disciplines support
physical value creation throughout an operational process,
IT combines all necessary technologies for data and infor-
mation processing, transmission, and storage. The bound-
ary between these two distinct zones of ICS generally resides
across levels three and four of the Purdue model. Since CIM
conception, most industries have developed and managed
OT and IT independently, as isolated domains. However,
over recent years, OT has started to progressively adopt IT-
like technologies [7]. A prerequisite to achieving these bene-
fits is that strategic, organisational, and technological chal-
lenges are mastered. Implementing what some call IT/OT
convergence (i.e. the end-to-end management of IT and
OT), implies that IT and OT strategies are harmonized,
common governance and process models are installed, secu-
rity and data are managed centrally, and human resources
are re-skilled to understand the distinct requirements of both
disciplines.
While existing works have explored the challenges of
IT/OT convergence, social and technical factors are often
discussed in isolation, or in theoretical terms. Social factors
relate to individuals skill sets, behaviours, goals, challenges,
requirements, etc. Technical factors related to the adop-
tion of IT technologies within the OT domain, increased
complexity/diversity of devices, increased functionality and
interactions across multiple system levels, etc. When com-
bined, the requirement for increasing technical complexity
and functionality can be understood, accounting for indi-
viduals’ requirements in order to meet set objectives across
each system level. However, detailed discussion of combined
social and technical factors requires empirical data sets, and
a comprehensive analysis, allowing for a clear interpretation
of observed joint challenges. This paper presents the results
of an empirical study, used to better understand technical
data flows and processing points within an ICS, whilst also
highlighting the complexity and crossover of human (social)
factors.
Security standards and guidelines provide a resource by
which practical steps can be taken to improve security and
resilience; however, advice on understanding a system prior
to risk assessment and control implementation is limited.
Together with the challenges identified above, we therefore
see the need for a tool that will aid the discovery of a systems
attack surface. This includes identification of data flows and
processing points, and highlighting of not only system-to-
system, but system-to-user relationships. Obtaining clear
visibility of data pathways is not a simple task. Where data
from multiple sources may be processed and combined, prior
to further transmission as new inputs to additional devices,
complexity in the level of system-to-user interaction is in-
creased, with a plethora of individual requirements, chal-
lenges, and goals.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces objectives, requirements, and challenges
when managing data flows in ICS. Section 3 conducts a re-
view of popular standards and guidelines used for risk as-
sessment and selection of security controls. Section 4 intro-
duces a case study and conceptual tool to better understand
system-to-system and system-to-user relationships, prior to
conclusions and future work in Section 5.
2. DATA FLOWS IN ICS
In many cases the controller and operator can observe
the physical process only through sensor readings, and must
have faith that the process data describes the true under-
lying situation. Processed in a variety of ways, sensor sig-
nals pass though a variety of functions such as amplifica-
tion, scaling, conversion, filtering, aggregation and normal-
isation to name a few. Furthermore, data sources are com-
bined through computation formulas prior to additional con-
troller and application consumption. In essence, data pro-
cessing is conducted to provide usable/actionable informa-
tion, based on the requirements defined by data consuming
circuits/devices/applications at each stage in a data chain.
Any error in data processing along a pathway harbours the
potential to degrade and even lose visibility of the process
state. Understanding data sources and pathways is essen-
tial to the comprehension of undesirable impact on process
operations, caused by errors or intentional manipulation of
data streams.
2.1 Data Reliability
OT engineers are responsible for data content. Data must
be collected from appropriate sources within the operational
process, conforming to any defined time constraints. As OT
has evolved, these requirements on data collection have seen
a significant shift. Thus, individual sensor inputs are no
longer solely used for local operational process decision mak-
ing on the plant floor. For example, in the UK, regulators
such as the Department for Environment, Food & Rural
Affairs (DEFRA) require data which identifies an organisa-
tion’s conformity to predetermined operational restrictions,
quality and quantity of final eﬄuent, for example [15]. These
underlying regulations drive operational requirements. How-
ever, this same data may also be used for performance anal-
ysis, and subsequently decision makers at board level, to
determine the financial viability of operational sites/zones,
and for identification of required investment to streamline
processes. Furthermore, it may also be applied to the re-
mote alarm monitoring/management of unmanned opera-
tional processes. In some cases, this remote monitoring and
management may form part of an organisational safety re-
porting processes. Without a clear understanding of devi-
ations to original requirements for data collection, the ap-
plication of system changes, let alone risk assessment and
security control implementation, presents a significant chal-
lenge.
When instrumentation engineers recalibrate or replace a
sensor, they will likely know to liaise with a PLC configu-
ration engineer, in order to account for the applied changes
within the PLC logic, therefore maintaining stable physical
process operations. This fulfils the initial requirement of sen-
sors, that of providing accurate input to operational decision
making. However, when re-configuration requirements arise
in relation to neighbouring devices, RTUs and Data Histo-
rians for example, if these are left unchanged, regulatory,
alarm monitoring, safety, and performance analytics data
may become compromised. In the given example, awareness
of sensor data consumption beyond the PLC could fall out-
side the scope of an instrumentation engineer’s role. It is for
this reason that identification of complex system-to-system
(device to device interactions) and system-to-user relation-
ships (end user and maintenance personnel interactions with
systems) and requirements, within the manufacturing zone
(Fig. 1), demonstrate the reality of OT challenges, formed
around the continuing deployment and development of new
and/or existing OT technology, in parallel to the growing
number of data users across all levels of ICS.
2.2 Data Integrity
Most attacks directed at operational processes (excluding
espionage) will seek to tamper with process data and infor-
mation flows. This is often assumed to involve a process by
which the attacker infiltrates a communications link, then
using replay, packet injection, or direction manipulation of
payloads, achieves an undesirable change. Application of
network monitoring and intrusion detection techniques are
seen as effective mitigation strategies. However, the level
of visibility they offer misses malicious manipulations oc-
curring within any given device, and infrequent legitimate
system-to-user interactions.
In ICS, data originates in the physical space, therefore
data reliability and integrity starts from the first point of
measurement being processed. Occurring at Level 0 of the
Purdue model, an analogue signal must first be calibrated
and scaled, transforming it into a useful unit of measure-
ment. This represents the first step where malicious actors
may manipulate the data [1]. Once converted into a digi-
tal value, the data is presented to a controller (PLC, RTU,
etc.) serving as an input to a control algorithm. Process
control decisions can be made automatically based on pre-
defined logic, or manually through user interaction with the
controller via a human machine interface (HMI).
Based on the automation pyramid principle described in
Section I, system comprehension and visibility can be fur-
ther increased through the mapping of data flows and data
processing points within individual devices. Once mapped,
a larger attack surface is revealed allowing for further refine-
ment of the risk assessment process and subsequent security
control implementation.
2.3 What is Missing
The potential impact on process operations caused through
errors arising in the form of incorrect data processing con-
figurations can be as significant as errors induced through
malicious manipulation. The latter requires implementation
of security controls. However, as ensuring data reliability
already presents a significant challenge, implementation of
security controls must be careful considered. In the event
of risk assessment and security control implementation pro-
ceeding based on inadequate knowledge of system-to-system
and system-to-user relationships within the OT domain, and
between OT/IT domains, additional risk is posed to objec-
tives across both domains.
Without a clear understanding of deviations to original
device requirements, the application of risk assessment and
security control implementation harbours a distinct possi-
bility of inadequate or inappropriate restriction being imple-
mented, degrading usability and negatively impacting opera-
tional, business, and security objectives across the organisa-
tion. In search of a solution, operators may look to standards
and guidelines for advice on risk assessment and security
control implementation. However, applying security stan-
dards requires an understanding of the system. With that,
the level of system understanding required, and methodol-
ogy by which it can be obtained/presented, are of critical
importance.
Obtaining a view of system-to-system and system-to-user
relationships, would provide a platform for comprehensive
risk assessment and subsequent tailored security control im-
plementation. Tailoring of controls with a more granular
view of data flows and processing points through the ICS
would increase harmonisation of data reliability and secu-
rity. Furthermore, visibility of system-to-user interaction
within data flows would allow for streamlined integration of
change management. This ensures that operational require-
ments defined by OT and IT personnel remain unaffected,
and where possible, optimised. Without the described level
of visibility, not only could system degradation occur, but
security controls could adequately protect one critical data
flow, yet remain completely blind to another.
3. OVERVIEW OF THE STANDARDS AND
GUIDELINES
In order to protect information, businesses are required
to implement rules and security controls around the protec-
tion of information, including the systems used to store and
process it. This is commonly achieved through the imple-
mentation of information security policies, standards, guide-
lines, and procedures. For ICS these can be industry spe-
cific [27], or more generic and all inclusive [32]. Applied
as a pre-requisite for regulatory compliance, or for their
comprehensive guidance, security standards and guidelines
offer a resource which has gained interest within the ICS
space. Therefore, the following sub-sections review a group
of widely used standards and guidelines 1. Designed to aid
the risk assessment and security control implementation pro-
cess, the following standards and guidelines are discussed.
From the British Standards Institute (BSI), ISO 27001 [4],
ISO 27002 [5], ISO 31010 [3], and ISO 27019 [6]. From
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
800-53 [21], 800-30 [20], and 800-82 [32]. To conclude, from
the Centre for the Protection of Critical National Infrastruc-
ture (CPNI), Managing the Business Risk [11], Risk Assess-
ment [9], Critical Security Controls written in collaboration
with the Council on CyberSecurity [14], and Select and Im-
plement Security Improvements [12].
These standards and guidelines have been selected due to
their direct targeting of ICS and critical infrastructure en-
1ISA99 (ISA-62443/IEC 62443) is recognised as a leading
ICS standard. However, as it is currently in working draft,
and is likely to be closely linked to ISO 27001 in the upcom-
ing revision, we have chosen not to include it here.
vironments [8], global acceptance as a “common-language”
for information security [19], and use across government di-
visions including the Department of Defense [29].
3.1 Overview of Risk Assessment Processes
Risk assessments output critical information used to de-
fine an organisation’s security requirements. Taking a basic
view of risk, [22] defines risk as “the possibility of a threat
exploiting a vulnerability and thereby causing harm to an
asset”. Therefore, in assessing risk, one should seek to under-
stand the existing system and environment in such a way as
to identify risks through pre-described assessment method-
ologies. System scope and objectives can influence the for-
mat of assessment, and subsequent output, for use in the im-
plementation of security controls, mitigating identified risks.
ISO 31010 [3] breaks the risk assessment process down into
three key stages: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk
evaluation. A broad table of techniques is presented, where
each technique’s applicability is mapped across the three
stages. From this table, each technique is then explained in
detail, including its use, required inputs, process, outputs,
and strengths/limitations.
NIST 800-30 [20] breaks the risk assessment process down
into five stages: Identify Threat Sources and Events, Iden-
tify Vulnerabilities and Predisposing Condition, Determine
Likelihood of Occurrence, Determine Magnitude of Impact,
and Determine Risk. In addition to this, three tiers are de-
fined to refine the requirements across the system: Organisa-
tion, Mission/Business Processes, and Information Systems.
Taking these as founding principles, each of the five stages is
discussed in detail, with required inputs, assessment scales,
taxonomies, templates, etc. all included for further practical
application.
CPNI Risk Assessment [9] provides a brief discussion of
the risk assessment process. The discussion is broken down
to four logical sections: identify the threat, decide what
needs to be protected and identify vulnerabilities, identify
measures to reduce risk, and review your security measures
and drills.
NIST 800-82 [32] focuses on special considerations for per-
forming risk assessments within ICS environments. This
covers factors such as safety, physical impact, non-digital
control components, propagation of impact to connected sys-
tems, etc. Additional points such as defining impact as per
FIPS 199 [26] (considering ICS risk in relation to its im-
pact on Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) is also
discussed. [26] states that through the use of its impact
assessment methodology, one can apply the output in pri-
oritisation of risk assessments, with lower impact systems
left unassessed.
ISO 27019 [6] provides a very brief definition of risk as-
sessment, including its use in security measures/control se-
lection. However, beyond this brief definition no further ICS
specific guidance is provided.
Managing the Business Risk [11] breaks the risk assess-
ment process down into three stages, defining the risk as-
sessment approach and supporting scales, high level priori-
tisation of the enterprise, and individual systems/site risk
assessment. In addition to the three core steps, four pre-
assessment steps are defined as understanding the systems,
threats, impacts, and vulnerabilities. Each of these four
steps is covered in detail, why each is important, and how it
can be considered. From these four points, the expected key
outputs of a risk assessment process are described, prior to
discussion around the three risk assessment stages, including
example impact scales, risk tables, and matrix.
Despite their varying levels of granularity, the risk assess-
ment frameworks described here follow a similar process to
the one summarised in Fig. 2. The described adaptation re-
quired to apply assessment approached in an ICS context,
even if provided at a high level of abstraction, offers a start-
ing point allowing for further exploration and development.
Figure 2: Risk assessment process overview
3.2 Overview of Security Controls Selection
Processes
Security controls are the management, operational, and
technical safeguards or countermeasures, employed within
an organisational information system. These provide safe-
guards or countermeasures, against the realisation of secu-
rity risks to assets identified through a risk assessment pro-
cess, where assets are defined as any organisational resource
(data, systems, humans, etc.) [37].
ISO 27001 [4] provides a set of overarching security con-
trols categories, subcategories with associated objectives,
and individual controls where each control is presented in
the form of a clear concise description. Through the ap-
plication of categorisation, selection of relevant controls is
simplified. ISO 27002 [5] sits in parallel to the controls cov-
ered in [4], providing more granular detail on each control,
including implementation guidance and other relevant infor-
mation.
NIST 800-53 [21] presents guidance on security controls in
a similar way to [4] and [5]. Presenting overarching security
control categories, subcategories with associated objectives,
and individual controls with relevant related controls high-
lighted for further exploration.
ISO 27019 [6] takes the security controls defined in an
outdated revision of [5] ([2]) and discusses, where applicable,
additional information specific to the energy utility sector.
NIST 800-82 [32] takes recommendations as described in
[21] and provides additional ICS-specific Recommendations
and Guidance, similar to, yet in more detail than [6]. An
overlay is provided within appendix G, used to further un-
derstand how controls must be tailored to fit ICS environ-
ments. Furthermore, acknowledgement is made towards ICS
specific challenges, and where recommended controls can not
be applied, compensatory controls may be adopted in their
place.
CPNI/Council on Cyber Security Top 20 Security Con-
trols [14] is designed for a broad ranging audience, as such
it does not contain the level of granularity offered by other
works. However, twenty overarching categories of security
controls are defined, sub-categories then present descriptions
of specific security controls and their goals.
CPNI Select and Implement Security Improvements [12]
is not designed to present a comprehensive set of security
controls, but gives guidance on key factors to consider when
selecting and implementing controls. Discussion around
economies of scale, skill and experience, diversification, pri-
oritisation, costing, change control, etc. are all covered
within the context of ICS.
The security control selection and implementation stan-
dards and guidelines described here offer varying levels of
granularity. Their process can be summarised as in Fig. 3.
Tailoring of controls for use within an ICS context ranges
from high level consideration of prioritisation, skills, etc.
down to individual, control specific, augmentation advice.
The presentation of advice at varying levels of abstraction
can been as a positive, in that it plays to the strengths of a
diverse audience, specifically where ICS operators are ven-
turing into the world of security for the first time.
Figure 3: Security controls selection overview
3.3 What is Missing
One of the key challenges when performing a security risk
assessment is estimating where all the risks lie. Incomplete
understanding of risks yields narrowly formulated security
objectives and scant security controls.
The provided overview of standards and guidelines demon-
strates how well established approaches designed for IT sys-
tems have been adapted for an ICS audience. However, the
focus remains on information security, protecting access, and
ensuring secure delivery of packets, and not on securing pro-
cess operations. With a primary security objective of pro-
tecting data integrity, as loss of data integrity directly results
in loss of view, and therefore loss of control over the physi-
cal operational process. It is for this reason when seeking to
perform a risk assessment, and to subsequently implement
security controls, understanding the system on which such
tasks are to be performed becomes critical.
Where guidance is provided around understanding the
system, it may prove insufficient for comprehensive risk as-
sessment and security control implementation within an ICS
context. For example, [11] provides a set of questions that
could be used to create an inventory of devices, technologies,
asset owners, etc. considering upstream and downstream
dependencies. However, where [3] defines prerequisites for
individual assessment techniques, would the proposed inven-
tory, created with little guidance other than a set of ques-
tions, fulfil such prerequisites. Furthermore, where security
control implementation must consider system-wide objec-
tives/requirements, in parallel to risk assessment outputs, a
comprehensive understanding of the system is also required.
This understanding is required at a technical system-to-
system, and at a social system-to-user level.
Tools developed to assist the risk assessment process in-
clude [35], and provide the assessor a way in which their
systems can be measured against a catalogue of standards.
However, little advice is provided on how best to obtain
the information required to ensure accurate results are pro-
duced. Additional training focusing on system familiarisa-
tion is offered as an optional on-site resource [33]. Alterna-
tively, on-site offerings from ICS-CERT [34] can be requested
in a further attempt to bridge this gap. However, these ap-
pear to be high-level, and do not encompass system-to-user
relationships.
Viewpoints confined to a local level provide insufficient
granular visibility, and clear comprehension of the given sys-
tem, missing attack surfaces, and identification of not only
IT vs. OT, but OT vs. OT challenges. The resulting effect
is formulation of incomplete risk assessments. This has the
potential to lead towards implementation of ineffective and
even damaging security controls.
4. CASE STUDY
With the increasing complexity and challenges presented
in modern day ICS, reliance on current standards and guide-
lines may not include adequate advice to ensure desired lev-
els of system security and resilience. Although risk assess-
ment methodologies and security controls are described in
detail, advice on understanding the system may be insuffi-
cient.
To better understand and contextualise the relationships
and interconnect between systems and users across an ICS,
the following case study has been conducted in collabora-
tion with a European utility company. Initially focusing on
end-to-end system-to-system relationships at varying levels
of abstraction, Fig. 4 has been created as a conceptual visu-
alisation tool, aggregating information from several sources
(network architecture reviews, configuration reviews, inter-
views, etc.). From this system-to-system baseline, system-
to-user relationships are overlaid, thus presenting a holistic
view or “understanding” of the system beyond approaches
described by the reviewed standards and guidelines.
4.1 Data Flow Map
Fig. 4 presents the flow of data from a single sensor to re-
mote access connectivity residing within the highest level of
the ICS (Level 5). Each device (PLC, RTU, Historian, etc.),
and sub-component (memory location, interface, function,
etc.), is depicted by a square or circular node. Circular nodes
represents user interaction/visibility of process data via an
interface. Square nodes with dashed edges represent a func-
tion being applied to the data stream (i.e. a data processing
point). To highlight the complexity of device configuration,
system-to-system, and system-to-user interaction, the PLC
(nodes within the black dashed line) has been presented at a
lower level of abstraction, showing sub-components within a
logical flow. This increased level of granularity allows for
comprehension of critical functions and memory address-
ing, applied to the computational processing of one sig-
nal. Furthermore, separation of data used for monitoring
functionality by the RTU and Historian (DB2), vs. process
control functionality used within PLC control logic and by
HMIs/Workstations (DB1), demonstrates a clear separation
of duties and user access within the device.
Each node in Fig. 4 is colour coded to represent the sys-
tem level in which it resides according to the Purdue model.
However, as can be seen with some nodes (e.g.“AI Card
Slot 3”) two colours are applied. This application of colour
has been introduced where a device or sub-component, is
accessed and/or is under the control/management of sys-
Figure 4: Data flow of a single sensor through the levels of ICS reference architecture
tem users from more than one level. In this example, the
AI (analogue input) card represents a physical interface on
the PLC (a PLC sub-component). Level 0 instrumentation
engineers are responsible for sensors feeding this card, and
Level 1 control engineers are responsible for the operational
logic being executed on the PLC, therefore both require ac-
cess. This shared access could be required for fault-finding
and secondary verification of signal quality, among others.
Through this example, and consideration towards security of
the PLC, one could assume little additional risk is presented
through shared ownership; however without a detailed level
of system-to-user awareness, an appropriate assessment can
not be conducted.
Additional detail on system-to-user relationships can be
identified through the application of bidirectional links. For
example, one such link can be seen between DB1.DBD1 and
the HMI/Workstation. This communication path is pre-
dominantly used to observe the values stored in DB1.DBD1,
however in the case of an emergency, operators are able to
override this value. Situations of this nature can occur in
the case of a failed or faulty sensor, with manual readings
being taken directly at the source (i.e. a visual inspection
of the operational process in question), before being entered
into the HMI/Workstation interface.
Following guidance on appropriate assessment techniques
described in [24], analysis of network diagrams and infor-
mal engagement with support/maintenance personnel was
used to provide a high-level understanding of system devices.
This allow us to build an overarching end-to-end flow of data
over system devices and communication links. Applying the
aforementioned colour coding, highlights devices and their
position within the Purdue model. Interviews with person-
nel across each level were used in aligning access require-
ments to devices, thus identifying any shared ownership.
As described above, colour coding was applied to highlight
shared ownership/requirements. In all subsequent stages,
analysis was directed towards one device, a PLC. The pur-
pose of this narrowed scope was to identify sub-components
of the PLC, allowing for more detailed granular analysis.
Manufacturing zone (Fig. 1) network traffic captures and
basic configuration reviews identified core communication
interfaces and memory addressing. Additional refinement
required a more detailed configuration review (PLC ladder
logic), in parallel to interviews with manufacturing zone sup-
port/maintenance personnel.
Although the process description here presents a mod-
erately linear approach, we found each step and technique
allowed for greater comprehension of data captured across
all steps. Therefore, while these described steps provide the
foundation of our adopted approach, techniques were ap-
plied in a cyclic manner, running through several iterations
of analysis prior to the resulting data flow map in Fig. 4.
Exploration of more complex system-to-user relationships
first requires an understanding of role groups across each
level of the ICS. The following section explores this, relating
back to Fig. 4 and the overall discussion provided here.
4.2 System Users
A significant number and variety of roles were identi-
fied during the case study. These roles performed a mul-
titude of functions across the organisation, from operational
process management, to budgeting, mechanical engineering,
and performance evaluation. We first sought help in exist-
ing literature [31], and this identified six key roles within
ICS environments. These were Junior Operator, Senior Op-
erator, Supervisor, Technician, Engineer and Manager. Al-
though applicable to the case study, from interactions con-
ducted with the participating organisation, we determined
additional granularity would prove highly beneficial.
Firstly, baseline separation of core role functions and sys-
tem levels as discussed in our previous work [18], provided a
foundation for further discussion. As such, the role groups
highlighted through the case study have been separated into
two categories,“Operators”and“Support/Maintenance”. The
operators group could include physical access to operational
sites and control rooms, however system access excludes the
ability to modify device/system configurations. The Sup-
port/Maintenance group could also include physical access
to operational sites, control rooms, and data centres; how-
ever this role category includes the ability to modify de-
vice/system configurations. Table 1 presents a summary of
our case study findings, identifying key role groups and the
ICS levels in which they operate. The view of roles groups
provided through this case study adds significantly more
granularity, particularly when tied to system levels. Based
on Table 1, we can begin to analyse nodes within Fig. 4,
overlaying role information, and understanding challenges
induced through previously unconsidered system-to-user re-
lationships.
Operator Roles ICS Level
Process Control Operators 2,3,4,5
Local Process Managers 2,3,4,5
Regional Process Managers 3,4,5
Regulatory Monitors/Testers 2,3,4,5
Performance Analysts 4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Alarm Management Centre Operator 4,5
Health and Safety Officers 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Home Workers 3,4,5
Support/Maintenance Roles ICS Level
Electrical Engineers 0,1,2,5
Mechanical Engineers 0,5




Information Technology Engineers DMZ,4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Home Workers 3,DMZ,4,5
Table 1: ICS roles and associated permissions at ICS
levels
It is important to note that roles and permission as pre-
sented in Table 1 are not static. The diversity in role groups
across large vs. small ICS, sub-roles, and deviations in re-
sponsibilities over time, all add to role dynamics. For ex-
ample, the involvement of work experience/placements, ap-
prenticeship schemes, reorganisations, etc. can all influence
the system-to-user dynamic, even if for a short period. Also,
levels of seniority exist within some of the defined groups.
For example, in some engineering roles, junior engineers
(often referred to as “Technicians”) perform limited tasks
when compared to fully qualified engineers, and senior engi-
neers may perform additional tasks, or act as a knowledge-
base/resource for engineers and junior engineers alike.
To further highlight the importance of role identification
and system level mapping, an example of portable device
use was discussed though the case study. Instrumentation
engineers performing tasks within Level 0, connected their
laptops not only to the varying levels of OT networks, but
to the corporate IT network. Historically a dual laptop
approach had been adopted (usage of dedicated industrial
and general purpose laptops). However, consolidation was
deemed appropriate for cost saving and ease of ongoing de-
vice management. The risk associated with devices being
moved between OT and IT networks would at least on first
impressions appear to be significant, with security controls
restricting the flow of data between IT and OT effectively
bypassed. However, where the level of risk may or may not
be increased through this approach to portable device use, as
with the aforementioned analogue input card example, with-
out a clear understanding of system-to-user relationships,
appropriate assessment can not take place.
4.3 Discussion
Taking the previously discussed requirements of a sin-
gle sensor input (regulators, performance analysts, remote
alarm management, etc.), Fig. 4 and the associated role
groups in Table 1, provide a platform on which further anal-
ysis of data flows and critical data processing points can
be identified and assessed. Expanding on previous exam-
ples, we discussed the issue of multiple roles per node with
a DMZ historian server engineer. Historians are responsi-
ble for collecting data from remote field sites, performing
complex computational functions, and providing users with
data used in a variety of analytical frameworks (performance
analysis, regulatory requirements, etc.).
In Fig. 4 a temporary marker memory address in the PLC
logic (MD104) splits into two discrete datablocks, one for on-
site control logic and workstation interaction, the other for
off-site monitoring and alarm management, with several sys-
tems and users involved in directly supporting/utilising the
data at a local level (Levels 1, 2, and 3). The types of sys-
tem faults discussed, related to Level 1 control engineers (re-
sponsible for process logic) modifying functions or address-
ing prior to this data split. As the scope of their interaction
with the PLC is focused on process operations, there was lit-
tle consideration/understanding for other system and user
requirements. As a result, while all control logic/addressing
residing within process operations was modified to reflect
changes further down the chain, other logic/addressing was
not, leading to the corruption of calculations and values
within the historian server.
The way in which errors in operational data discussed
here are typically discovered further highlights the impor-
tance of role and device mapping. End users of this data
were highlighting deviation in values post specified dates
and times, a somewhat reactive approach. From the ini-
tial suspicions around spurious data, essentially data qual-
ity concerns, historian support engineers would drill down
into complex mathematical calculation to find a root cause.
Where calculation are derived from up to 30+ operational
tags (signal inputs), this process could prove time consum-
ing. Furthermore, where data is processed at multiple points
in the system, as seen in Fig. 4, the requirement for a high
level of access privileges becomes apparent, and where visi-
bility of data ends at the multicoloured node (PLC address-
ing), interaction with Level 1 control engineers would be
required to better understand any changes further down-
stream.
Additionally, with regards to the use of a marker mem-
ory location (MD) prior to transferral into datablocks (DB),
this could be considered a poor PLC coding choice. The size
of marker memory may be limited given the age of the de-
vice, offering limited value retention capabilities when the
device is powered down, and increasing PLC logic complex-
ity. A cleaner option would be to move this value directly
into the primary process control and local monitoring dat-
ablock (DB1), then if required by the RTU and Historian,
pass this value directly from DB1 into DB2. Derived values
generated by the PLC logic (e.g. where two sensor values
are entered into a calculation arriving at a new value) are al-
ready being passed from DB1 into DB2, therefore including
sensor values in this function would be a more logical and
cleaner approach, accompanied by the additional benefits
offered through datablock usage.
The conducted case study has been used to highlight tech-
nical complexities of interconnecting devices found within
ICS, and in the case of a PLC, complex configuration/logic,
including the separation of data based on operational objec-
tives. From this, the overlay of role groups has shown the
quantity and diversity of individuals operating and main-
taining such systems. Overall the case study has demon-
strated the challenges of addressing security, and that secu-
rity may not be addressed through purely technical means
(firewalls, IPS, etc.). Whether they be assessment metrics
or security controls, challenges must be addressed from a
socio-technical (humans and systems) viewpoint, incorpo-
rating the core operational objectives of each level and role
within assessment, planning, and mitigation strategies.
The level of granularity provided through the applica-
tion of Fig. 4 to security control implementation, based on
appropriate comprehensive risk assessment outputs, allows
for harmonisation of data reliability and security. This is
achieved through the tailoring of security controls consider-
ing system-to-system and system-to-user interactions, and
requirements. For example, at a low level, the deployment
of firewall rules controlling system and user interaction with
a specified PLC memory location can be achieved without
fear of system degradation between OT systems, address-
ing OT vs OT concerns, and between OT and IT systems,
addressing OT vs IT concerns.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Existing approaches to risk assessment and security con-
trol selection as defined by the reviewed standards and guide-
lines provide a good starting point. However, initial phases
of such assessments and ongoing support could be enhanced
through a better understanding of end-to-end system-to-
system and system-to-user interaction. From a risk perspec-
tive we have highlighted that simply obtaining an inventory
of devices and network architectures is insufficient to com-
prehensively map risk in ICS environments. Understanding
the relationships between roles and devices, and where possi-
ble, roles and device sub-component parameters, is required
to develop risk mitigation strategies.
Although the evolution of next-generation ICS security
control appliances seeks to provide granular rule-sets over
network traffic flows [13], guidance on obtaining a clear un-
derstanding of data flows and associated stakeholders is lim-
ited. Used in collaboration with our tool, a feedback loop
for granular formulation of control policies and traffic restric-
tions enforced by security products will be made possible.
Where previously described assessment tools [35] lack guid-
ance on obtaining system-to-system and system-to-user knowl-
edge, we believe our tool/approach could be adopted as a
pre-requisite. Applied in this way takes assessors beyond
current on-site ICS-CERT offerings, which assist in the iden-
tification of high-level (end point-to-end point) data flows,
and exclude system stakeholders [34]. This increased under-
standing/familiarisation of system-to-system and system-to-
user relationships will allow for more detailed, accurate as-
sessment results to be generated. To further validate this
assertion, we will seek to engage with risk assessors and se-
curity practitioners at real-world facilities, while making use
of Lancaster’s [28, 17] and Singapore’s (Secure Water Treat-
ment (SWaT)) [25] test-bed environments. This will involve
the evaluation of risk assessment and control implementa-
tion, applying existing methodologies for“understanding the
system”, prior to the use of our proposed tool.
5.1 Future Work
As we have not yet provided a method by which others
can effectively obtain granular data flows within their own
environments, this will be our core focus in future work.
This approach will be accompanied by a framework of pa-
rameters one must adhere to in the creation of data flow,
processing, and user interaction maps. In addition to this,
integration of tools and techniques for data capture will be
explored, in order to assist the process.
The development of a formal methodology will aim to en-
sure practical scalability of our tool. Focused management
of methodological overhead plays a significant role in achiev-
ing this goal. This can be assisted through the use of passive
network analysis tools [13] [38], and continuing industry en-
gagement. Detailing techniques for signal prioritisation will
also be used, narrowing scope where insufficient resources
are available for comprehensive analysis. Through ongoing
discussion with industry, we believe RTU criticality scale
could be used as a metric. Our engagement with industry
has shown that large scale manufacturing zones can have as
little as a few 10s of signals of highest criticality, providing
a starting point for granular data flow, processing, and user
interaction mapping.
Going further, we will explore scoping of parameters that
focus on time constants of system-to-system interactions and
associated data processing point criticality (time to negative
impact), essentially aiding the formulation of device config-
uration requirements. This increased scope in “understand-
ing the system” will provide yet more granularity, giving
risk assessment and security control implementation highly
detailed visibility of device requirements/objectives.
Increased visibility into data flows, alongside comprehen-
sion of data processing points, and data consumption re-
lationships, will be essential to forensic investigations. As
a starting point we will look to explore the proposed tools
use in the determination of infected devices (where unautho-
rised data change is occurring), estimation of attack origins
(through the analysis of interdependencies), and identifica-
tion of compromised user credentials.
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